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I*ni very pleased to be here today. What I would like to do today is have a
very open meeting. I would like to have you ask any questions you may have. If
I irritate anyone, it's because I'm trying, although I really do not want to offend
anyone. I am not a typical bureaucrat; I was brought up in Brookings, South Dakota
and they always told me around here to say what you think, so I do, and this has
created undo misery for me at times.
First, I want to give you a brief run down of some selected agricultural
statistics which may be kind of boring to some, but also interesting and then to
talk to you a little bit about the trade negotiations that are now going on in
Geneva and Washington and throughout the world. First off. Dr. Berg mentioned the
role of agricultural exports. In the ten years between 1967 and 1977 there was a
significant increase in exports of grains—basically wheat, corn, oilseeds, and
soybeans—and in animal products which includes hides and the skins, tallow and
what we call variety meat. Grains and soybeans play a vital role in our agri
cultural trade; two commodities which are produced in some abundance in this state.
The phenomenal increase in the value of our exports started in 1966, at about
a little over $5 billion of which about $1 billion was under Public Law A80, or
subsidized exports. We're up to about $30 billion I think this year.
Another factor of great importance was the role of agricultural exports in
the balance of payments in the balance of trade. The interesting thing is, if
you look back to 1966 our agricultural exports as related to our agricultural
imports were fairly in balance; in fact if you took the Public Law 480 out of there,
they would have been in balance. So the contribution that agriculture was making to
the balance of payments - balance of trade was very limited. In 1977, and 1978 we
were running in the neighborhood of a $15 billion trade surplus in agriculture.
This is an absolutely major significant factor these days, especially when you're
running an oil deficit as we are now. In the absence of these agricultural exports
there's no question in my mind that the dollar would be so weak that it would be
hard to find it on the international market, so we are making a great contribution
to the welfare of the United States by paying in large part - at least at the margin
of the cost of many of our vital imports.
I would like to look at some of the commodities a little bit more carefully
because it shows some of the interesting developments that have occurred in the
last few years. The quantity of exports of both feed and seed grains in 1971
* Transcript of remarks made at Agri-Business Day, March 27, 1979. Edited by
Robert J. Antonides.
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grains. Across the years, wheat has increased to some extent but corn has increased
phenomenally, whre corn now is just about double the tonnage of wheat. The reason
for that is quite simple. As incomes increase in the developed countries and some
developing countries, the need for a change in the diet towards higher—quality diet
(at least in livestock) becomes more important; and their imports are basically
corn and soybean meal for chickens, eggs, turkeys and pork.
So, if these countries are to increase their production of livestock products,
they have to depend on the imports of these commodities and that's why our feed
grain exports have expanded so extensively. This is also happening in Japan. And
strangely enough, there are markets now developing for feed grains in countries like
Korea. Taiwan has become a large market for U.S. corn and soybeans. And of course
the biggest developing market that we have now is none other than Old Mexico which
has such a high birth rate that they'll have something in the neighborhood of 100
xniilion people by the end of this century. They'll also have (soon) a lot of oil.
So Mexico has become a major market for U.S. feed inputs.
Now let's look at the other side of this feed input and that is of course the
soybeans. The miracle crop! And again, we note the large increases in the exports
of soybeans, soybean meal and the fairly consistent level of the oil. 1 don't know
what we'd do without the soybeans. They have become one of the greatest commodities
we've ever seen. It's the gourmet of all agricultural commodities. Strangely
enough, for so many people who come to get acquainted with agriculture, the first
question I ask them is "Do you know what a soybean is?" It is amazing how few
people understand this product. Charles Shultz said we should be trading soybeans
instead of gold. And this wouldn't be so bad if it was just the general public,
but when you start asking people who are looking for jobs in the Foreign Agri
cultural Service what a soybean is and they don't know, you get a little excited
about it. Again, this is the other side of the livestock complex. The increase
in the feed grain exports and the soybean meal and the soybean exports is none
other than an increase in the demand for high quality foods and we hope this will
continue.
Because of South Dakota's great interest in livestock, I might say that our
exports are fairly limited on beef and on poultry and on dairy products. We re
developing some markets now in Japan for high quality beef; we're developing one
we think, if we get through the negotiations which I'll talk about later, for high
quality beef in the European community. And we already have a very significant
market' for turkeys in the European community and for chickens in the Japanese,
Hong Kong and Singapore markets. Our sales of dairy products are limited to
a little bit of our canned milk and some of those products; very little cheese.
The reason being, of course, is we have the second highest support price in the
world for dairy prices next to the European community. We'll talk a little bit
more about that later.
During 1976, which I think is a fairly representative year, the U.S. accounted
for 41 percent of total world trade in wheat, 58 percent in feed grains, 22 percent
in rye, and 22 percent in poultry; but the big one was soybeans, 77 percent. Meal
we had 28 percent; that's meal other than soybean oilseed meal. This gives you an
idea of what a major factor we are in the world market for bulk commodities.
Another interesting set of statistics gives the U.S. exports as a percent of
total U.S. production with a comparison 1967 and 1977. Our wheat exports stayed
at about 46-47 percent of our total production. Our feed grains jumped from 12
to 24 percent which is very fascinating. If you project our production and our
exports, we'll be exporting everything in a matter of 50 years and won't have
anything to eat at all. The one I always enjoy is the rice one. We exported
about 63 percent one year and 48 percent the other in comparison. The thing is
that we're one of the smallest producers of rice in the world, but we sure like
to export that stuff; especially under Food For Freedom. The only other one that
I have great interest in is soybeans. Our exports of beans in 1967 was 27 percent
of our production and went to 35 percent in 1977. But if you add the protein meal
and the oil, you come up with about 55-60 percent of the total soybean production
going overseas in one of those three forms. I'll just leave that one alone for
a minute.
Now I'd like to talk for a little while about the trade negotiations that are
now going on in Geneva. The Trade Act was passed about 40 years ago and it gave
the President authority to liberalize world trade in agricultural and non-agri-
cultural products. There was a big concern four or five years ago that, because
of the recession in the world, countries would tend to become more isolationist
and move away from liberal trade policies. The ansxi/ers of Congress and of the
President and of the Administration at that time were to try to move towards more
liberal trade policies, in part to combat the isolationist tendencies that were
growing in many countries. The Democrats won the election and they chose to
carry out the administration programs which had been passed by the Republican
authorities when they were in power. So, you might say that the idea of carrying
out liberal trade activity is a bipartisan activity but there are times you wonder
how bipartisan it is.
One of the major supporters of this trade legislation was the agricultural
community. I don't think it was because of our attitude towards how nice it is
to have liberal trade. It was just the fact that when you export twice as much
agricultural products as you import and your total agricultural economy is highly
dependent on these exports that you better get out there and kind of keep that trade
going. So agriculture has been a very major supporter of these trade negotiations.
And I say agriculture because I mean agriculture, I don't mean certain segments of
agriculture. I think that the support has been very great from such conservative
groups as the American Farm Bureau, which has already indicated that they would
support the trade package that's been put together. There's other people that
aren't too enthused at this point, including the American Dairy Association. Then
there's the national cattlemen who seem to be supporting certain elements of it.
Let me go through it just a little bit with you and tell you know it works; give
you some ideas of what we've been dealing with.
•First- of all, I want to say that yesterday some of the graduate students asked
me, "Where are you coming from? RTiat's your bottom line?" Well, I'm coming from
commercial agriculture from the Foreign Agricultural Service. My bottom line is
farm income and reducing government costs - very simple. Our business is to increase
farm income and if possible at the same time to reduce government costs. The way
you do that is to export more. You export more and the more you export at world
prices, which are in normal situations fairly favorable to use, the higher the farm
income and the lower the government costs. So that's our business and that's where
I'm coming from if you've got any questions as we go along. I'm not in economic
development. I believe that in the long run economic development plays a vital
role in expanding our commercial exports. But right now I'm a short-run guy.
Trade negotiations are being carried out by the special trade representative of
the President. His name is Robert Strause. I think you're probably familiar with
him as being chairman of the Democratic Party not too long ago. He is a Texas lawyer,
a raiser of avacados, and a real nice guy. He is assisted in this endeavor by two
deputies, both of whom have had ambassadorial rank. One is Allen Wolfe, a lawyer
and the other one is A1 McDonald who came in from a large research firm. McDonald
has handled the negotiations with the ninety-odd countries and a larp staff in^ ^
Geneva. Wolfe has run the Washington office and the total coordination and decision
making has been done by Strause.
Now, there are agricultural and non-agricultural elements to this negotiation.
You negotiate with every country in the world that wants to negotiate with you and
you have experts that want to negotiate agriculture. I don t know anything about
the industrial negotiations. I'm on the agriculture side. We have a team that
has been negotiating with all the major factors in the market; we have negotiated
with all of the European Community, with other western European countries. e
have not negotiated with countries which are not members of this trade organization
called GATT-General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade. And that includes most of the
eastern European countries and Russia and China. But we have negotiated with about
79 countries though so far.
What do we do in these negotiations? Essentially three things. First of all
we have a set of codes - "thou shall" and "thou shall not" - and the most important
code to agriculture is the "subsidy" code. We are interested in meeting competition
in markets on a competitive basis. Not on a basis of subsidized exports. ^ e ave
been hit very hard this year by the European Community's exports of wheat into the
world market at ridiculous prices. We now want to use the subsidy code to at^least
limit this activity by the European Community. So that's part of the code we ve
worked out. The code essentially says that while you can subsidize, you cannot
replace traditional suppliers or increase the value of your exports to that marke
your market share - by more than an equitable basis.
In return, to get that subsidy code we have had to accept an "injury" code.
Now I'm getting very technical at this point and I want to explain what we mean by
injury and subsidy. Today we have a law in the United States that says if any
country is subsidizing their exports to us, we can automatically put a duty on the
imports of those products equal to the amount of the subsidy.^ For example,
peas are being subsidized by the European community to the United States, say at
20c a pound, we automatically put on a 20c a pound duty to off-set that subsidy.
There is no test of injury at this time. You just do it automatically.
A test of injury means, "Does it hurt you?" We say, "We don't ^eally care
if it hurt or not, we're just principally opposed to this type of thing.
we've accepted an injury test - which we're still trying to work out - which will
allow subsidized imports of certain products including cheese and probably even a
little beef in the European community. But this we are accepting. The injury tes
that we will have will be of such a nature as to secure, I think, absolute secuiity
to our growers. Furthermore, the actions that we are taking would include limits
on imports of these products so that no matter if they subsidize or not, the amount
coming in would be severely limited.
We then have two agreements - we used to have three - a wheat agreement, a dairy
agreement and a beef agreement. But we're down to two now; three agreements didn t
work out. We have a dairy agreement which calls for minimum prices in the world
market equal to about a third of our support price. This won't affect us very muc
because we're not a major exporter of dairy products. It will affect New Zealand
and Australia who have to sell at world prices without subsidy and it will give
them a good opportunity, hopefully, to at least get a minimum price for their pro
duct. And that's important in New Zealand where the average market price for milk
is $4.00 per hundredweight.
So, we have a code for dairy. We have an agreement on beef where we will
inform each other about the cycles and talk about what the beef situation is. It's
purely a matter of exchange of information. So that's the second part of the three
part package that makes up the trade negotiations; the first being the codes, the
second being the agreements.
Now we get to the third part, the most sensitive, and that is reductions and
duties on imports and on exports. And this is the one which you'll hear the most
about when the question is asked: "What did we get out of the trade negotiations?"
We gained cuts in duties that will mean our exports will increase by five or six
hundred million dollars more than they would have otherwise in the absence of these
reductions. This is where we spent more of our time and effort and this is the most
sensitive area. In this area we have made progress in reducing the barriers to trade
by increasing the quotas on beef and on citrus to Japan, both of which are major
items of concern to us because the Japanese have such high prices and they're very
lucrative markets.
V7e are making some progress in restraining the increase on duties on tobacco
in the European community, a major market for tobacco, and also we think we are
going to come up with an increase in our exports of high quality beef to the European
Community. Rice; we got some concessions very worthwhile to the Community on rice.
Altogether we have hundreds really of modest but important significant trade
concessions from our trading partners. I think one of the most important concessions
which will not increase trade in the short run, but which is very important to us in
the long run, is what we call a "binding" on the duty for soybeans in Japan—at zero
duty. Now what that means is that the Japanese have bound and committed themselves
never to increase the duty on soybeans from zero, meaning there is no duty on the
imports of U.S. soybeans. In recent years they have not put a duty on soybeans;
they could have if they wanted to and this could have been very difficult for us
if they had. This was a committment they made. Private countries make committments
on sensitive agricultural items. I think we received zero-duty bindings on $1.3
billion worth of trade based on 1976 and in the years to come that will be important.
Let met give you an example why. In 1962 we got some zero-duty bindings from the
European Community and that trade has grown from $100 million dollars to $2.5 billion.
It's raising all types of trouble with their support price program for grains in the
European Community, but we have held fast to that zero-duty binding and our people
have fought hard to get this zero-duty binding with Japan.
So we have gained very much, I think, in these trade negotiations. But the
major thing we have gained is the momentum to continue to increase liberalization
of trade in the world. And we've agreed to codes of conduct, not perfect, but very
important to us. We have to have some rules to the game because we're the guys
in agriculture that are out front on this one and we're the ones who can be hurt
if there are no rules. So, while the gains in terms of actual increase in imports
and exports might seem rather modest, the fact of the matter is that all countries
have agreed to continue to play the game and that's the most important aspect of
this entire negotiation.
Now just a few things on a couple of other items. We made a concession on
cheese to the European Community and that concession is to increase our imports by
66 million pounds above the 1977 level. In 1978 the amount of cheese that came in
increased by 33 million pounds. So if we don't get this agreement into position by
the end of this year, it's quite possible that we will have to reduce our cheese
imports to liberalize our trade. In other words, it's quite possible that the
forces of the market would influence us in such a manner that the amount of cheese
that would come into this market in the absence of this concession that we made would
be greater that it would be under the concession. This sounds stupid, but it's
very true. What we agreed to do, is put all cheese, except sheeps milk cheeses,
under strict quotas. And right now they're not under strict quotas. In so doing,
we will limit the amount of cheese coming into our market to 125 thousand metric
tons, which isn't very much cheese. It will in turn give the other countries who
are supplying us with this cheese the security of the market which they've been
looking for.
Now, on beef. It's a very interesting product. We import more beef than
any other major country in the world. In fact, we're the major importers of beef.
Now the beef v/e import is from Australia and New Zealand which constitutes 75
percent of our imports, the rest coming from such countries as Canada, Mexico,
and Central America. Many have the mistaken idea that Argentina is a major supplier
of beef to the United States market". It just isn't true. The big supplier is
Australia, the second biggest is New Zealand. V/hat type of beef do we bring into
the United States? We bring in grass-fed, low quality beef. What is it used for?
It's mixed with fat trimmings of high-quality beef and basically it's hamburger.
And it's utilized by hamburger shops and for industrial purposes, \lhat would we do
in the absence of the imports of this beef? We would have higher prices for ham
burger. Are the prices for hamburger high now? Yes, they are very high. How much
do we bring in? V/e brought in, this year, about 1,570,000,000 pounds, However,
most of the beef we get is grown here at home. Will we increase our beef imports
due to the trade negotiations going on now? The answer is no. We have made no
concession which V70uld increase the amount of beef brought into this market. None
whatsoever.
Why is it that we bring more beef in years where our own production is increasing
and less in years where our production is being reduced? The answer is we don't. The
formula which establishes the amount of beef coming in is the market-sharing formula
that is managed by the executive, and I might say both administrations—the Republican
and the Democratic—in the exact same way. Wlien prices of beef are high, the President
utilizes his discretion to take off restraints on imports, ^-^len prices are low, he
uses his authority to maintain the imports at a lower level than what would other
wise occur. Right now there is a great deal of misunderstanding about the beef law
and there are many people v/ho talk about the counter-cyclical factor as being the
way in which this program should be taken care of, and they might be right. But in
ray o\-m personal opinion, I never can remember as an economist any formula that I can
institute which can work without some degree of discretion because we're just not
that bright. The President has maintained that he would be willing to put in a
counter-cyclical law to govern meat imports as long as his authority to manage the
program remains; that he has discretion to manage the program is in the interest of
all Americans. I bring this to your attention because I know that there has been
such talk, many other tariffs written and much concern regarding the beef situation.
But I would also like to bring it to your attention for another reason. UTiile
it's fine for the cheese people to say we don't want any more cheese and for the
beef people to argue against letting imports in at the time when production in
the United States is increasing, we also have the fact that we have to deal with
the rules of the game. To tell the Australians that the imports of beef into the ^
United States (their exports) should be governed by our cycle - when we want it we 11
take it, when we don't want it we won't take it - isn't exactly what we had in mind
when we asked the Europeans to put a levy on their duty on soybeans at zero. We
can say bind it at zero and if this soybean meal interferes with your programs,
then go ahead and forget it. We said, you plant it at zero and we don t care
now much fat, dry milk and cheese you're going to put into stocks, you keep that at
zero, that's what you maintain. So we can't turn around and say to the Australians,
look boys, you know, we take the beef when we need it and we won't take it when we
don't need it.
In other words, there's a little hurt involved in this game. But I think the
hurt is worth it when you look at the balance of trade and the importance of exports
to our agricultural economy.
THE POTENTIAL FOR COMMERCIAL GRAIN EXPORTS TO AFRICA*
Thomas E. Daves
Much attention is now focused on the potential for expansion of grain
exports as a mechanism for improving the net incomes of U.S. grain producers
and the U.S. foreign trade balance. Among prospective new or expanded com
mercial markets for U.S. grain are the developing countries, many of which
had been food self-sufficient until recent years. Particularly attractive as
potential markets are those countries with rapidly growing populations, stag
nation and/or limited potential in agriculture, and large foreign exchange
earnings; e.g., the oil producing countries of the Middle East and North Africa.
This paper focuses on the developing countries and territories of Africa
as a potential market for U.S. grain exports."^ The specific objectives are to
summarize the current and prospective future food and feed grain production
consumption balance in Africa and to evaluate the potential for increased com
mercial exports of grains to African nations by the United States.
Hypotheses are that African grain production will increasingly meet inter
nal consumption needs and that there is little potential for expansion of com
mercial imports of grains from the United States. Commercial grain imports
from the U.S. will be limited in the short run by the lack of foreign exchange
earnings capacity in most African states and by intra-African trade; in the
long run by the development of Africa's own production capacity which could
well place the continent in a competitive grain export role by 2000.
Some Statistics
A review of the absolute levels and growth rates of population and grain
production in Africa for recent years gives support to those observers who
foresee increasing grain deficits and, consequently, import needs on the
continent.^ The estimated population of Africa increased from 270 million in^
1962 to 419 million in 1977 (4, Vols 17 and 31). Estimates of three-year grain
production averages for Africa centered on the same years were 48 million and
59 million metric tons, respectively (see Table 1). Compounded 1962-1977
growth rates calculated from these estimates are 3.0 percent per year for
population, 2.3 percent per year for grain production.
Thus, the internally produced grain supply decreased relative to population
from about 154 kg per capita in 1962 to 141 kg per capita in 1977. Neither of
*Paper presented at the 17th Agri-Business Day, Economics Department, South
Dakota State University, March 27, 1979.
^Of the 45 independent countries and 12 territories or colonies in Africa,
only the Republic of South Africa is classified as developed by the U.S. govern
ment and the various United Nations development agencies.
^The argument for a rapidly deteriorating total food (and therefore grain)
balance in Africa is made in great detail by the International Food Policy
Research Institute (7). Its very discouraging projections for 1990 (e.g., a
staple crop deficit of 45% of consumption needs for the Schel group) are based
on estimates of population and production trends for recent years.
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these per capita totals is near the 180 kg of grain estimated by FAG to be
needed for adequate nutrition in the type of high grain diet typical in Africa.
However, with supplementation by other plant and animal products, Africa's grain
production level in the early 1960's was only slightly in deficit, an average
1.2 million tons per year over the 1960-1963 period (Table 1).
As indicated by the per capita estimates, the African grain balance has not
been as good in recent years. The average grain deficit for 1975-78 was 8.2
million tons. And, this larger deficit was not made up by other agricultural
production sectors. The USDA estimated an index of total African food production
per capita in 1977 of 92, on a 1961-65 base (1, p. 7).
Moreover, the composition and regional distribution of production and con
sumption were such that substantial shortages of supply occurred for some types
of grain in some countries, notably wheat in North Africa and Nigeria (6).
Wheat Imports in 1976
(thousand metric tons)
Algeria
Egypt
Lybia
Tunisia
Morocco
Nigeria
1502
2919
560
318
1200
745
It should be noted that most of the wheat imported by all of these countries
except Lybia and Nigeria was provided at highly concessional terms, much of it
by the United States.
Arguments Supporting a Pessimistic View
Larger grain and total food deficits in Africa are presaged by factors
affecting both demand and supply.
In terms of demand the most important fact of life is the inexorable growth
in population. Population, now growing at an average rate of three percent per
year, is expected to increase even more rapidly in many African countries over
the next twenty years or so because of improvements in nutrition, public health,
and medical services.
The second important factor affecting demand is income. At the levels of
income of most African families income elasticity of demand is high; i.e., as
family incomes increase a substantial portion of the increase is allocated to
food purchases. Therefore as (or, more realistically, if) African incomes
increase, per capita food consumption can be expected to increase as well. To
some extent this type of food demand expansion will result in increased demand
for cereals of all types. However, as incomes increase, and as rapid urbani
zation continues, a change in the composition of diets is also to be expected.
As a first level change the preferences for wheat and rice by African salaried
workers, the wealthy, and city dwellers in general will cause more and more
people to substitute wheat products and/or rice in their diets for course grains.
This means less barley consumption in the North and less millet or sorghum
consumption in the sub-Saharan region. A second level change induced by increased
incomes and/or urbanization will be a shift to more diversified diets with more
meat, vegetables and fruits.
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Another consideration with respect to the role for increased incomes as a
stimulator of effective food demand is that because of the relative sizes of
the various economic sectors, agriculture must of necessity be the primary source
of income improvement in most African countries. Thus increased incomes, should
they occur, will largely be based on agricultural supply increases tending to
solve the grain - food deficit problem.
Although the prospects for improved incomes are uncertain, the African popu
lation will undoubtedly continue to Increase at a rapid rate and most observers
that there will be increased demand for cereals both for direct consumption
and for more intensively-grown livestock, through the end of this century.
On the supply side powerful arguments can be made that grain production is
x\ot growing rapidly enough to keep up v'ith nutritional needs or consumer pre
ferences, nor, as indicated by the increasing deficits, is it keeping up with
effective demand5 i.e., people's willingness and ability to buy at prevailing
prices. Also, there is scepticism that production growth rates will improve,
because African farmers suffer from general ignorance of modern techniques, have
low skills, lack access to new technology (improved seeds, chemical products),
have limited market access because of poor transportation, communications,
storage and processing facilities, and face fuel and fertilizer prices above their
abilities to pay. In many areas they also face severe climatic limitations such
as extreme intra-year rainfall variability, recurring drought and land resource
degradation. Furthermore, production will continue to be adversely affected by
unstable political, social, and economic conditions in most of these countries.
Particularly inhibiting to production may be the price control and government
marketing policies prevalent in most of these countries — policies that are
designed primarily to tax agriculture directly or indirectly to finance govern
ment activities benefiting other sectors, and to hold do\7n food expenditures of
urban wage—earners. Also there is a general lack of public investment capital'
in most African nations. The negative effects of this lack is magnified for
agriculture because a small percentage of most national capital budgets in
Africa has been allocated to agriculture, with even less to agricultural projects
or activities promising a quick payoff.
Reasons for a More Optimistic Outlook
One factor, that if not a source of optimism at least might temper the more
pessimistic views, is that the true levels of economic variables of all types —
including population, grain production and consumption, and income — are not
known. In few, if any, of the developing African countries are reliable data
available. For example, current population estimates for the African continent
developed by international agencies on the basis of country data from various
sources differ by up to 50 million people. In Tunisia in the early 1970 s it
took two years of debate, most of it totally uninformed, to decide whether
there were 80,000 or 120,000 hectares of irrigated cropland in the country. In
Mali, Niger, Upper Volta and probably numerous other countries, production
estimates are made by applying standard consumption norms to presumed population
levels, adjusted by official trade statistics and by assumed on-farm stock
levels, losses, clandestine exports and imports and how hungry people look.
Alternatively, purchases of grain by government monopolies are assumed to be a
given percentage of total marketings, which in turn are assumed to be another
given percentage of total production.
Thus it can be argued that projections or even current assessments of
African agricultural performance relative to needs are specious and may grossly
overstate the problem. On the other hand, they may understate it. My own
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observation is that although most people in Africa are desperately poor by
Western standards, most also have enough to eat.
In looking to the future a source of optimism relative to African self-
sufficiency in grains is the abundance of natural resources. Despite the Sahara,
in terms of agricultural potential Africa is rich in land, in total and per
person. The North African coast, the breadbasket of the Roman Empire, has
large areas — upwards of 150,000 square miles of some of the World s best
wheat land, with dependable growing season rainfall of from 15 to 30 inches.
Average wheat yields throughout this region are less than 10 bushels per acre,
so the possibility for improvement is great.
The Sahelian region stretching completely across Africa in a 100-150 mile
wide band just south of the Sahara has even more land of good quality in the
15 to 35 inches rainfall zone. Large areas of this land are now unused or are
used only for extensive livestock production. For example, only about 5
percent of the arable land in Mali is now used for crops. In Upper Volta enough
excess ].and is available to allow faJ.low periods of up to 60 years or more for
the typical slash-and-burn agriculture that needs only 8 to 15 years for rejuvenation after 7 to 10 years of continuous crops. In Niger and parts of
Senegal cultivated areas around villages are often miles apart, with much of
the intervening land of quality equal to that now farmed.
The tropical rain forest of the vjestern coastal and south central areas has
much untapped agricultural potential that is slowly being developed as research
results from the various tropically oriented•agricultural research stations
become available.
Also, even in some of the low rainfall'areas, Africa has abundant developable
water resources provided by the great African rivers: the Nile, Niger, Congo,
Senegal, Gambia, Zambezi and others. An example of the potential for irrigation
is the Interior Delta of the Niger, in Mali, which comprises one million
hectares, most of which is innundated each year in flood season. Of this area
only about 15 percent is now intensively cropped. Fifty percent or more of
this land could be cropped intensively and with water control yields of rice,
sugarcane, millet, sorghum, vegetables could be as high as anywhere in the
world.
Africa has always had the great natural resource base, yet has never even
remotely approached its agricultural potential at any level of knoun technology.
But, beginning about 1960 things began happening in Africa that had never happened
before — things that promise to bring African agriculture much closer to world
technological and managerial norms and much closer to its latent potential.
Perhaps most important, in most of the African nations governments that
care about their citizen's welfare are in power. For the first time indigenous
African people are gaining experience in modern governmental and business
management. In spite of frequent coups d'etat and other manifestations of
political instability, government is improving in ability, in knowledge of
practical constraints and opportunities and in desire for real, as opposed to
showplace, social and economic progress. And, most African governments have
recently mounted specific long term campaigns to achieve a high degree of
food self-sufficiency, which means expanded grain production.
International technical and financial assistance to Africa at more than
token levels began only in the 1970's. It is growing rapidly, and throughout
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Africa it has a major emphasis on agriculture. Fertilizers, improved seeds,
and small or intermediate but modern farm implements (animal dra\vTi in less
developed areas, machine drawn in others) have been introduced and are spreading
rapidly. Fertilizer consumption in Africa increased 10.1 percent per year
between 1950/51 and 1975/76 (4). High yielding wheats, first tried in Tunisia
in 1968 on 800 hectares, were seeded on 225,000 hectares in that country in
1976 (8, Annex I, Appendix 2, Table 6). Similar programs are at work in other
countries.
Also, irrigation works, roads, centralized commodity storage, communication
systems and other infrastructure are being developed. Education is increasingly
available. Research is beginning for food as well as export crops. Attempts
are being made to remove human and livestock disease constraints to open up
potentially highly productive new agricultural areas.
People in rural areas are now well aware of and are actively seeking to
participate in the market economy. They have agricultural goods for sale, much
of it grain, and could produce much more should appropriate market incentives(prices) develop. Rural people want to improve their lives; now they see
a possibility that was never there before.
Conclusions and Implications
Per capita grain production in Africa has apparently declined over the past
15 years as have total food and total agricultural production per capita, with
the result that increasing shortages have occurred and imports have been required.
Many problems remain that lead some observers to project or predict increasing^
grain deficits and hence import needs. These problems include: rapid population
growth; ignorance; illiteracy and poverty among African farmers; an often harsh
and variable climate; political-social-economic disorganization and instability;
primative technology; lack of infrastructure; and capital shortages. However,
progress in alleviating these problems that has been made only in recent years
but that is accelerating leads me to believe that the next 15 years may well see
real progress in African agriculture, and in its grain sector in particular.
Abundant natural resources and the associated human potential to exploit them
are available. A dramatic take-off in African agriculture is possible if
current national and international assistance efforts are maintained and
strengthened. I think they will be.
Implications for U.S. grain exports to Africa are that lack of foreign
exchange earnings in Africa will fprestall large commercial imports in the short
run, and that domestic African production will in the long run. Except^^for
Egypt, Algeria, and Nigeria, African nations have been included in the "other
category in the grain exports tables of U.S. statistical reports. It is unlikely
that there will be increases in the volumes of grain exports to Africa sufficient
to cause changes in this procedure.
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IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. FOOD ASSISTANCE FOR
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH ASIA*
Thomas L. Dobbs
Extension Economist—Rural Development
South Dakota State University
I have been asked to comment briefly today on some of the implications of
U.S. food assistance programs for agricultural development in the world's less
developed countries (LDCs). U.S. food assistance policy has been and will
continue to be of vital interest to South Dakota and other Great Plains States.
Wheat, a principal agricultural product of this region, has been one of the
major food assistance commodities provided by the U.S. over the past 25 years.
It is therefore important that we understand both our own policy objectives
and those of recipient Third World countries as we participate in the on-going
dialogue on trade, foreign assistance, and food assistance in particular.
My overseas experience in agricultural development has been primarily in
the countries of South Asia, particularly India and Pakistan. I will therefore
address my comments primarily to U.S. food assistance as it has and may in the
future affect development in the countries constituting South Asia. A focus
on this region is appropriate for other reasons, as well.
First, the three principal South Asian countries — India, Pakistan, and
Bangladesh — are populated by nearly 800 million people. Without doubt, much
of the world's worst poverty is concentrated among these people. The need to
import food will continue for some years to come in this part of the world.
Second, the potential for successful agricultural development is great in
much of South Asia. The Indo-Gangetic Plain of Pakistan and northern India is
a vast wheat and rice producing region rivaled in size, fertility, and produc
tion potential by few other regions in the world. As an indication of potential,
32 million of Pakistan's A1 million acres of crops are under some form of
irrigation. However, fertilizer use and crop yields are extremely low by
developed country standards. One question before us here is whether U.S. food
assistance is consistent with or can facilitate developing such potential.
Brief History of U.S. Food Assistance^
U.S. food assistance is based on legislation passed in 1954, Public Law
(P.L.) 480. The original program was designed to reduce U.S. grain surpluses,
to expand our export markets, and to continue U.S. assistance efforts to Europe
and the less developed countries.
*Prepared for Seventeenth Annual Agri-Business Day, March 27, 1979,
sponsored by the Economics Department, South Dakota State University,
Brookings, South Dakota.
^This section draws heavily on two U.S. Department of Agriculture publica
tions which, combined, comprehensively review U.S. experience with food
assistance. They are items [1] and [7] in the attached list of sources.
The legislation was amended in 1966 in response to a changing supply picture
here and abroad. India was in the midst of a 2-year drought and in need of
major food imports. Though the U.S. felt committed to assist India and other
LDCs in similar circumstances, our ov^m grain stocks were relatively low. As
a consequence, the 1966 legislation placed much greater emphasis on agricultural
development. Recipient countries were to be more strongly encouraged and^
assisted in efforts to increase their own food production. U.S. food assistance
policy "evolved from a primary emphasis on shipping agricultural surpluses to
one aimed at feeding hungry people, encouraging agricultural and overall economic
development abroad, building commercial markets for our exports, and supporting
U.S. foreign policies." [1, p. 13]
The world food shortages of the early 1970's brought about further changes
in our food assistance program. The tonnage of grain shipped under P.L. A80
provisions fell to its lowest level ever in 197A (Figure 1). Legislation of
the mid-1970s placed certain priorities on the most needy countries in making
food assistance allocations. Further stress was placed on economic development
provisions of the food assistance program.
Some 25 billion dollars worth of commodities were shipped under P.L. A80
financing between the time of program initiation in 1935 and the year 1976. This
represented roughly 1A% of all U.S. agricultural exports (in dollar terms) during
those years. India was by far the leading recipient nation, receiving a total
of more than $5 billion in P.L. A80 assistance. Other nations which received
more than $1 billion each in U.S. food assistance during that time period were
Pakistan, South Korea, South Vietnam, Egypt, Indonesia, and Yugoslavia.
(See Table 1.)
Wheat and wheat products have constituted the largest single item in our
food assistance program. They made up A8% of the value of all P.L. A80 shipments
from the start of the program through September 1977 [5, Appendix Table 8].
In the early years of the P.L. A80 program, much of the food was provided
in exchange for soft currencies, meaning local currencies the U.S. could spend
only within each particular recipient country. This type of sale was gradually
phased out in the late 1960s and early 1970s and replaced by dollar sales on
extremely easy, long-term loan terms. Approximately 70% of the shipments under
the P.L. A80 program have been either local currency or dollar sales. ^ Most of
the remainder have been grants. (There were some barter arrangements in early
years of the program.) Afairly recent provision allows part of a country's
P.L. A80 loan to be forgiven local currencies generated by sales of food
received under the assistance program are used for agricultural and certain
other development projects which are jointly approved by the U.S. and the
recipient government.
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Food Needs and Food Potential of South Asia
Food "needs" in relation to projected production within the world's LDCs
are truly massive over at least the next dozen years. In spite of the produc
tion potential of South Asia which I mentioned earlier, continued and enlarged
See [7, p. 9].
^Much of this section is drawn from a recent study by the International Food
Policy Research Institute in Washington, D.C. [2].
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SOURCE: John W. Mellor and Barbara Huddleston, "Programming United States Food
Aid to Meet Humanitarian and Developmental Objectives," Working Paper
78/A/PUB of the International Food Policy Research Institute,
Washington, D.C., p. 28.
TABLE 1. MAJOR RECIPIENTS OF P.L. 480 ASSISTANCE
FROM FISCAL YEARS 1955 THROUGH 1975
COUNTRY
INDIA
PAKISTAN
SOUTH KOREA
SOUTH VIETNAM
EGYPT
INDONESIA
YUGOSLAVIA
BRAZIL
ISRAEL
TURKEY
SPAIN
POLAND
BANGLADESH
ITALY
REPUBLIC OF CHINA
MOROCCO
UNITED KINGDOM
CHILE
TUNISIA
KHMER REPUBLIC
PHILIPPINES
COLUMBIA
GREECE
WEST GERMANY
WORLD TOTAL
MILLION DOLLARS
OF ASSISTANCE
5,318
1,817
1,555
1,454
1,132
1,025
1,021
893
588
574
25,087
Source: Amalia Vellianitis - Fidas and Eileen Marsar Manfredi. P.L. ^
Concessional Sales -- History, Proceedures, Ne.^otiating
and Implementing Arrangements, Foreign Agricultural Economic
Report No. 142. Washington, B.C. Economic Research
Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, December 1977 , p.11.
food deficits are very possible in much of Asia, including India and Bangladesh
(Table 2).
India's deficit as measured by production in relation to actual consumption
is modest at present. However, the sheer size of its population, coupled with
an expected annual population growth rate of nearly 2.5% for the next several
years, could result in a nearly AO million-metric ton annual dietary deficit by
1990 (Table 2). India would have to increase its annual agricultural growth rate
from 2.5% to about A% to. completely avoid dietary deficits by then.
Although Bangladesh has only about one-eighth the population of India,
its food availability prospects are proportionately much more bleak. It could
be facing a more than 12 million-ton food deficit by 1990 if it can not boost
its agricultural growth rate above the 1.5% annual rate of the past 15 years.
Projections indicate that Pakistan could be in a food surplus situation
by 1990. However, for various reasons, Pakistan's agricultural performance in
the 1970s has been far below expectations generated in the late 1960s. Pakistan
has found it quite difficult to extend the "Green Revolution" to those of its
poorer farmers who have less access to irrigation water, credit, fertilizer,
extension services, etc. than those who first adopted high yielding practices
about 10 to 12 years ago. Thus, I am not at all confident Pakistan will experience
in the near future the kind of agricultural growth indicated in Table 2 — even
though a great deal of raw potential does exist.
I don't want to leave this section on too somber a note. Although it is
hard to be optimistic about Bangladesh in the near future, India and Pakistan
face relatively better prospects. However, those prospects depend at least in
part on the nature of available food and development assistance programs.
Considerations in Programming Food Assistance to South Asia
Some of the objectives of U.S. food assistance, as they have evolved over
the years, have been briefly alluded to already. However, I have listed them
in Table 3 to facilitate understanding of how our own objectives may relate to
those of recipient nations. The first three U.S. objectives listed pertain to
our own rather narrowly defined self-interests. Other objectives listed, which
are presumably shared by the U.S. and recipient countries, can be broadly
categorized as humanitarian and developmental.. I would maintain that these
objectives are also in our own self-interest ^ we take a long enough view
and consider the costs of V7orld instability associated with large numbers of
countries remaining underdeveloped*.
The basic problem that has beset our food assistance efforts over the years
is that pursuit of some of these objectives often conflicts with pursuit of
others. Among the potential conflicts are the following:
1, Disposal of U.S. surpluses and provision of food assistance for
humanitarian purposes sometimes results in a lack of commitment to agricultural
development within the recipient country. There has been a long-standing debate
on whether or not U.S. food assistance has, on balance, enhanced agricultural
Many of the ideas in this section are drawn from two very useful papers
recently written by staff of the International Food Policy Research Institute.
They are cited as [3] and [A] in the list of sources.
COUNTRY
INDIA
BANGLADESH
PAKISTAN
TABLE 2. FOOD DEFICITS AND AGRICULTURAL
GROWTH RATES IN SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES.
FOOD DEFICIT IN
RELATIOf^ TO DIETARY
ENERGY REQUIREMENTS
PROJECTED
IN 1975 1990
(million metric tons
OF CERIAL EQUI-
VALANTS)
2A.9 39.^
12.5
(3.0.
surplus)
ANNUAL AGRICULTURAL
GROWTH RATES
1960-75
PERIOD
REQUIRED
1975-90 TO
AVOID
DEFICIT
Source: Food Needs of Developing Countries: Projections of Production and
Consumption to 1990. Research Report 3. Washington, D.C.: The
International Food Policy Research Institute, December 1977, pp. 73-81
TABLE 3. OBJECTIVES OF U.S. FOOD ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
U.S. OBJECTIVES
1. DISPOSAL OF U.S.
AGRICULTURAL SURPLUSES
2. DEVELOPMENT OF EXPORT
MARKETS
3. SUPPORT MILITARY AND
POLITICAL FOREIGN
POLICY OBJECTIVES
^1. EMERGENCY RELIEF
5. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
SUPPORT
I
6. INTERNAL BUDGETARY
SUPPORT (through INTERNAL
SALES OF GRAIN RECEIVED)
7. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
i
8. ECONOMIC. DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE
OBJECTIVES SHARED BY
RECIPIENT NATIONS
1. EMERGENCY RELIEF
2. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
SUPPORT
3. INTERNAL BUDGETARY SUPPORT
(through internal sales
OF GRAIN received)
ij. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
5. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE
development objectives in the countries of South Asia. Certainly, there have
been periods when the South Asian governments were less committed to appropriate
price incentives and other agricultural development policies than they would have
been in the absence of P.L. 480 cushions to rely on. I believe this was the
case in Pakistan in the mid-1970s.
On the other hand, appropriately programmed food assistance can enhance
developmental objectives. This can be done if necessary government action is
taken to guarantee domestic farm prices at incentive levels, if food is channeled
to those who would otherwise lack ability to purchase adequate amounts, and if
other developmental steps are taken, such as channeling some of the assistance
through "food-for-work" activities which create infrastructure. Most importantly,
food assistance can help provide the "wage goods" necessary for an employment
oriented development strategy. There will be continued opportunities for this
kind of constructive use of food assistance in India and Bangladesh.
2. The use of food assistance to create commercial export markets for U.S.
agricultural products is not always consistent with agricultural development
objectives of recipient governments. Taiwan and South Korea are examples of
countries which have, for the most part, graduated from being recipients of food
assistance to being significant commercial importers of U.S. food. Those countries
may have a continued comparative advantage in importing certain kinds of food
while exporting other goods.
However, while wheat has been a major component of our food assistance pack
age in South Asia, I do not think creation of a long-term commercial market for
U.S. wheat in much of that region is consistent with the South Asian countries'^
own best developmental interests. In the medium to long—term, Pakistan and India
might more economically produce all of their own wheat supplies than import any
on commercial terms from the U.S. Since Bangladesh is primarily a rice producing
country, there may be some long—term potential for commercial wheat imports there.
However, even those needs may eventually be more economically provided by other
countries within the region, such as Pakistan.
Our long term perspective on creation of export markets through food
assistance must be broader than any single commodity. Experience around the
world has demonstrated that as countries begin to achieve significant levels
of development, they tend to become commercial trading partners with the U.S.
and other nations in a broad range of agricultural and other goods. Thus,
while South Asia may have a comparative advantage in providing all of its own
wheat in the long run, countries such as Pakistan and India may turn out to be
major commercial markets for other U.S. agricultural or non-agricultural
goods—goods which they could not have purchased on commercial terms had they
remained at low levels of development. It should be noted in this regard that
more than 70% of the value of our agricultural exports to Pakistan are already
on commercial terms [6, p. 62].
3. Food aid for emergency relief is sometimes in conflict with the use
of food as a development assistance tool. This is a conflict caused by food
assistance being available in quite limited amounts. The U.S. has not made
available large amounts of commodities and funds for food assistance in recent
years. As a consequence, world—wide allocations of this assistance, in effect,
involve trade-offs between variable and stable food assistance. It appears to
me that an emphasis on the variable or emergency component has resulted in^
little long-term programming and stability to our food assistance efforts in
individual countries. This makes it very difficult for recipient countries
to count on any particular level of food assistance over time and, therefore,
to build such assistance into their development plans in meaningful ways.
This problem seems unlikely to be resolved until two things happen. One
is for satisfactory emergency grain reserve policies to be worked out among
and within food exporting and food deficit countries. These policies are
necessary to handle emergency or variable food assistance efforts. The other is
for the U.S. to commit itself to some particular, sustained level of developmental
food assistance over at least a 5 to 10—year period. This would provide the
stable component needed in addition to intermittent emergency assistance by LDCs
such as India and Bangladesh.
Concluding Comments
Other conflicts in food assistance objectives could be cited if time
permitted. Many of the conflicts could be mitigated if the U.S. were to make a
long term commitment to food and other development assistance. A long-term
commitment would provide the kind of stability that is essential for effective
developmental use of food assistance, as opposed to mainly emergency and
humanitarian uses. With the potential for significant multi-year food assistance
commitments, the U.S. would possess the kind of leverage needed to negotiate
meaningful self-help m.easures with recipient governments.
It would appear that there is room for a continued and enlarged U.S.
food assistance effort in India and Bangladesh for some years to come. This
region should not be viewed as a "dumping ground," however. In the first place,
India, at least, will no longer tolerate that kind of paternalistic relationship
with the U.S. In the second place, and more importantly, the "dumping ground"
approach is inconsistent with our own long-term interest in seeing that region
of the world develop.
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J.D. LYND
HONORED AGRI-BUSINESS PERSON for 1979
Mr. J.D. Lynd displays the plaque presented to him by Dr. John
Thompson, head of the Economics Department at SDSU. Mr. Lynd became
the tenth South Dakotan to receive the award, presented at the annual
Agri-Business Day conference in Brookings.
Lynd, executive secretary of the South Dakota Association of
Cooperatives at Huron, was cited for his "highly visible leadership"
in the field of agri-business.
Lynd represents his association on 14 ag-related committees and
organizations in South Dakota and currently chairs or serves as vice-
chairman on five of these. He was instrumental in the 1971 formation
of the Ag Unity Group, a coalition of 26 South Dakota agricultural
organizations. He serves as its chairman and foremost spokesman for
legislative matters in Pierre, and his frequent radio reports on
lawmaking activity there are heard across the state.
As executive officer for the South Dakota Association of Cooper
atives, Lynd is responsible for an array of activities among which
are lobbying, planning and program development for member cooper
atives, coordinating and evaluating member services, public infor
mation, and working with agricultural youth organizations.
Comments by Honored Agri-Business Person of 1979
J. D. Lynd
It is an honor to receive the Agri-Business Person of the year award. I*m proud
to be on the list of distinguished individuals the Economics Department has honored
in the past.
An event such as Agri-Business Day makes a person stop and think about agricul
ture. With my involvement in agricultural organizations the past few years, I know
that different agricultural groups in the state have come a long way in working
together. And by working together, we have accomplished a lot of common goals.
I also think that we*ve all come a long way in getting agriculture and agri
business working together as an industry. The agriculture industry is certainly
better for the cooperation from its components.
SDSU and the Economics Department's research and other programs have been instru
mental in the advancement of the agricultural industry. We have seen increased pro
duction and efficiency, better management and new techniques come about as a result
of these research and teaching programs.
One of the most important offshoots, or results, of such research is the
development of manufacturing and processing of more and more agricultural products
in South Dakota. Development of processing means we're expanding the industry.
Expansion, and also finding and creating more and better markets, is the biggest
challenge facing South Dakota agriculture.
Almost equal to that challenge, and certainly related to it is the problem
we now have with transportation. Adequate, stable and reasonable transportation
is vital to every phase of agriculture—the production, processing and marketing—
and securing such transportation could spell the success or failure of the industry
as a whole.
As SDSU has shared in the past progress of the agricultural industry, it will
no doubt share in solving our marketing and transportation problems. I look for
ward to working closely with SDSU as they put together the kind of research that
will help us meet those challenges.
My work with agriculture in this state has given me plenty of reason to be
optimistic that these and our other problems can be resolved. If we keep every
body involved in the agricultural industry, from the production through processing
and marketing, working together, and working with state and federal agencies, agri
culture as a business and an industry will continue to improve and to expand.
"Projecting Our Grain Transportation Demands"
Charles E. Lamberton, Associate Professor, Economics, S.D.S.U.
Professor Vollmers will be discussing the situation and outlook for South
Dakota roads and highways. Director Myers will address the state's railroad
situation. To set the stage for them, I would like to briefly provide some
dimension to our principal transportation problem — moving grain.
We estimate that South Dakota's production of six important commodities
(barley, corn, oats, sorghum, soybeans, and wheat) in the mid-1980's will be in
the range of 325-330 million bushels. The breakdown of this production by Crop
Reporting District is shown on Chart I. Also shown there is the number of
farm truckloads required to move this production off the farm. Over one million
such truckload movements will be required.
Of course, most of this traffic will occur east of the Missouri River:
900,000 truckloads or 82% of the trips. Only 18% of the trips will be west of
the River. Because of the shorter farm-to-market distance in the East, the 82%
of the trips will require only an estimated 64% of the truck miles — some 10
million truck miles. The relatively fixed nature of several components of
highway costs, such as construction, snow removal, and routine maintenance
* costs, means that the resource cost per bushel-mile is much greater in areas of
lighter density grain production. That is, it is more expensive to provide
more miles of collector roads for less traffic. For our grain traffic estimate
(and ignoring the effects of other traffic), roughly 36% of the state's entire
highway costs are West River and incurred on behalf of only 18% of the state's
grain production.
In addition to moving grain to market, the collector road system is used
to move feed and other farm inputs out to the farm. We estimate the the equiva
lent of some 150 million bushels of feed grains will be trucked. (Chart II).
This represents about one-half million truckloads. Again, the traffic density is
greater in the East with 84% of the trips incurring only 68% of the truck miles.
The combined grain and feed movements between farms and local markets will
involve some 475 million bushels, 1.5 million truckloads, and 22 million truck
miles driven. East of the River this represents driving some 36.8 miles per
1000 bushels while West River requires approximately 92.9 miles per 1000 bushels.
Thus these farm costs are about 2.5 times greater in the West than in the East.
If our Western producers are to compete in the marketplace they must either:
a) accept a lower income in the form of lower grain prices and higher input
prices or a lower quality road system; or, b) be supported by greater non-farm
traffic and highway subsidy.
Not only will our road system need to carry this local traffic, it will
also be required to move commodities between Districts in the state. Several
Districts must import feed grain from other areas of the state (Chart III). As
suming that all such imports are intrastate, some 26 million bushels, or 35,000
truckloads, will travel over the highway system.
These movements leave some 193 million bushels to be exported from South
Dakota (Chart IV). This represents the potential grain to be moved to out-of-state
markets by either truck or rail. As the rail system has deteriorated and been
reduced, the highway system has been improved. Thus, the railroads' share of this
traffic has declined until only approximately 64% of the state's grain exports were
shipped by rail in 1974. This trend away from rail use is also due to the
state's cropping pattern. Over 10% of the exportable surplus is corn and the
most protective corn producing areas are within economical trucking distance of
^ the Twin City and Sioux City river terminals. Ninety percent of the state's
oats are producefd East River and comprise 45% of the exportable surplus.
The 193 million bushels to be exported will require as many as 257,000
truckloads or up to 55,000 covered hopper carloads. To retain a rail system
in South Dakpta, there is no alternative to keeping this grain traffic on the
rails. While the trend away from rail use is likely to continue in the near
term, several factors will cause the trend to be reversed over the longer run.
These factors include: the recent abandonments of light density lines reducing
the financial drain on railroads and setting the stage for the concentration of
grain traffic originations on the state's primary lines with greater traffic
density; the continuing shift in the state's elevator system toward fewer, but
larger, elevators located on those primary lines and capable of loading 25
hopper cars within 24 hours; the rapidly rising costs of highways and trucking
service; the increasing importance of the Pacific Northwest export market where
the long distance rail movement has a cost advantage over trucks; and, the recog
nition of the railroad problem in the 4R's Act which has resulted in the devel
opment of a longer range state rail plan, funds for the rehabilitation of some
lines, and greater long-term service certainty for potential rail use investors.
A long-term core rail system will be viable if: a) the grain traffic
reverts back to the railroad; and, b) the coal and lumber bridge traffic cross
ing S.D. lines is retained and encouraged. Both of these conditions will require
substantial investments in facilities to load and carry loaded hopper cars.
This investment will be forthcoming only if the traffic potential is made appar
ent and tariffs are sufficient to make the investment profitable. Therefore,
the long-term prospects for South Dakota rail service will depend upon South
Dakota shippers' willingness to demand and pay for that service. The principal
component of that demand must come from grain shippers.
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SOUTH DAKOTA HIGHWAYS:
CONDITIONS AND ALTERNATIVES
Agri-Business Day, S.D.S.U.
March 27, 1979
A. Clyde Vollmers
Assistant Professor, Agricultural Marketing
South Dakota State University
South Dakota farmers are experiencing difficulties in trans
porting their products to market. And while the current focus
is on the rail abandonment issue, the long-term problem is much
broader. This presentation will examine the present condition
of the various classes of highways and roads serving the agriculture
interests of South Dakota and then will explore some alternative
courses of action available to state shippers.
The highway and road system serving the state of South
Dakota is rapidly deteriorating- and many miles are no longer
adequate to serve the needs of commerce and agriculture. But
neither the state or local units of government have adequate^
funding to maintain the existing roads system and the financial
situation is getting worse. As abandonment of rail lines followed
deferred maintenance and deterioration of the rail lines, abandon
ment of highways and roads may follow deferred maintenance and
deterioration of roads.
The Current Situation
South Dakota is served by about 81,500 miles of highways,
roads and streets. Eleven percent of this mileage is maintained
by the state government while the remainder is maintained by
local units of government. Just over 15,000 miles of highways are
paved, of which about half are maintained by the state.
Table 1. Approximate mileage of South Dakota highways and roads.
Road Type
Interstate system
Federal aid roads
State primary
State secondary
County and city^
Local, rural and city
Total
Approximate Mileage
5,877
2,446
8,286
64,200
81,500
The Interstate System
The interstate system provides fast, direct links between
farmers and their distant market. These roads provide adequate
service and are not part of the focus of this paper.
The State Primary System
The heart of the highway and road system which serves South
Dakota's agriculture is the 5,877 mile Federal aid primary highway
system. This system connects the various communities in the state
and provides farmers access to distant markets.
Currently there are nearly 800 miles within the primary system
which need immediate resurfacing before they deteriorate to the
rebuilding stage. If road pavement is not resurfaced while it
still is in "fair condition" by Federal standards, it will lose
too much structural strength to benefit from resurfacing and must
eventually be removed and replaced. The cost of rebuilding
highways is approximately four and one-half times the cost of
resurfacing.
Currently the state is over $175 million behind in main
taining the primary system to Federal standards. And because
costs are increasing faster than revenues it is falling behind
by an additional $30-$40 million each year just on the primary
system.
In 1978 the state of South Dakota spent $101 million in
highway maintenance. This was a substantial increase over the
$69 million spent in 1968. However, because of increased construe
tion costs and inflation, the 1978 investment purchased 40 percent
less highway than the 1968 expenditure. In the six year period
since 1972 revenues from the gas tax, the major source of state
highway funds, have increased 21 percent. In one year, 1978, the
cost of building and maintaining highways increased 21% and wider
use of small economy cars, the 55 mile per hour speed limit, and
the development of more fuel efficient engines has restricted
the amount of- fuel used which limits potential growth of gas tax
receipts in the future.
The State Secondary System
The condition of the state secondary system has not been
evaluated recently by the Department of Transportation. However,
the amount of money expended on these roads probably indicates
their condition.
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leaving nothing to maintain the secondary roads serving agriculture.
Without maintenance these roads are rapidly deteriorating beyond
normal maintenance and will need rebuilding.
Federal Aid County Roads and City Streets
There are nearly 8,300 miles of county roads and city
streets which are in the Federal aid system. Many of these roads
are hard-surfaced and provide farmers with a high quality road
to reach nearby marketing outlets. The cost of improving these
roads to Federal standards is unknown but their condition was
described by a county highway superintendent._ He stated,
"the older rural roads are slowly going downhill."
Rural Local Roads
Most of the roads in South Dakota are local rural roads or
city streets which include city, county and township roads not
in the Federal aid system. These roads are generally gravel
and are the "farm door" roads which provide farmers access to their
local markets. Their exact condition has not been completely
determined but estimates can be made.
About 70 percent of the rural bridges serving the agri
cultural sector of the United States were built before 1935 and
designed to carry loads of six to seven tons. And about SO percent
of the structures of the nation's local rural roads were built
before 1950. The result is that the v/idth, bases and capacities
of these roads and bridges were designed to meet the traffic needs
of the 1930's and 1940's. Since 1950 , however, farm truck capacity
and machinery size has increased substantially, making these roads
technologically obsolete. This obsolescence has been compounded by
increased yields per acre which increased the volume of grain
flowing over the roads. Moreover, rail abandonment often increases
the distance grain moves by farm truck. In addition to being
technologically obsolete a recent inventory indicated that nearly
40 percent of the bridges in this system are physically obsolete
and in need of replacement or repair. In 1970 the Federal Highway
Administration estimated that the cost to maintain all local roads
in the United States in a tolerable service condition would cost$9.8 billion per year. But in 1976 less than 40 percent of this
amount was spent. Thus it is probably safe to assume that many
miles of township and county roads are inadequate and in places
unsafe for 1979 traffic.
Alternative Courses of Action
There are many alternative solutions which the state could
pursue. This section explores the feasibility of some of these.
In examining these alternatives it is important to bear in
mind that "there is no free lunch." Highways cost money. Rebuilding
and maintenance costs must be paid through some form of taxation.
Furthermore, each alternative examined includes some costs paid
through taxes and other costs paid through private expenditures.
Finally there is no "right" answer. Rather the state and local
governinent will probably use each of the following alternatives in
different situations.
Reduce speed and weight limits
Heavy loads and high speed's increase maintenance costs for
roads and bridges. But limiting load size increases the marketing
costs for farmers -- that is, if, in fact, the load and speed limits
are observed and enforced effectively.
Reduce maintenance standards
Rebuilding cost on some county and low use state roads could
be reduced by lowering the minimum reconstruction and maintenance
standards. Right-of-way width, shoulders and bridge width,
pavement thickness and maximum grades could all be reduced.
However, as standards are reduced maintenance costs increase.
The cost of operating cars and trucks also increases as
road conditions deteriorate. A study projected in 1979 indicates
South Dakota drivers will incur over $33 million of additional
expenses. Poor roads result in increased gas and tire consumption
and higher repair bills.
Drivers are still the primary cause of traffic accidents,^
but obsolete engineering and road design rank second. According
to one study obsolete roads were the major factor in 19.5% of
South Dakota traffic accidents. This study also reported that
fatalities and injuries were reduced over 25% with effective road
modernization. The annual cost of the accidents caused by obsolete
roads is estimated to be $14.6 million.
Continue present policy
For the present, large increases in taxes can be avoided by
maintaining existing levels of spending and sources of revenue.
However, the present policy is resulting in a continuing deteriora
tion of the roads serving agriculture and delayed repairs also result
in increased rebuilding cost. Furthermore, as bridges and roads
deteriorate and become dangerous, the state and counties can face
increasing exposure to large tort liability claims for damages.
Courts historically have been generous to these claims.
Shift responsibility between county and state
Some local government officials feel counties and cities
should receive a larger share of gas tax revenue. And state
authorities have suggested shifting ownership of some state high
ways to the counties. However, both of these suggestions simply
change responsibility and do not increase revenues or reduce
spending needs.
Increased state and local taxes
Increasing taxes is always difficult and the current mood
compounds the difficulty. Dakota proposition indicates that some
states residents are not willing to continue paying for services
provided by pronerty taxes which include local rural roads. More
over, South Dakota ranked 47th in per canita income in 1976 which
indicates a limited amount of wealth is available to maintain roads.
However, the level of taxation does determine the level of
highways. If the state wants to upgrade the highway and roads
system some increased taxation is a necessity. Governmental units
also need to determine the source of increased revenues -- gas taxes,
property taxes or some other form of taxes.
Secure increases in Federal funding
Presently a substantial portion of state and local highway
funding comes from Federal sources. But to solve the road problem
for all systems in South Dakota, Federal funding would probably
have to be at least doubled. The current taxpayers mood nationally
probably precludes any significant increase from Federal sources.
And the proposed constitutional amendment which would force a
balanced national budget could induce Congress to reevaluate
existing spending.
In the past South Dakota has lost some Federal funds because
of the billboard problem which has now been resolved. But, the
money gained will only reduce the deficit on the state primary system
from $35 million to $31 million, an improvement, but certainly not
a solution.
Abandonment of selected roads
A rural road which once served several families may nov; serve
one farm or may simply provide a farmer access to his fields. County
governments are maintianing what were once vital roads but essentially
are now personal driveways. South Dakota has more miles of road per
capita than any other state except North Dakota and regardless of
all other decisions some of these roads will be abandoned in the
future. The question is, "How many and which ones?"
Abandonment of rural roads is also a costly decision. Govern
mental units may incur legal judgment for, lack of access. Farmers^
will also incur additional costs: first, they will have to maintain
additional private roads, and secondly they will incur additional
marketing costs as roads are closed, forcing them to drive further
to market.
Rationalization of rail and highway system
The state of South Dakota currently is served by a rail and
highway system both of which need extensive rebuilding. While the
agricultural producers in the state need both systems one over the
other is not the issue. The issue is what can and what vvMll the state
provide? As long as funding is limited the most efficient solution
may be to integrate the tv/o systems into one grain marketing network.
This would involve abandonment of both rail lines and roads sub
stantially reducing the amount of money needed for ungrading. Farmers
may bear increased marketing costs due to tliese reduced services.
But, the alternative of maintaining both systems would result in
even higher costs to the farmer because of increased tax burden
and low quality roads. The problem of rationalization is whether
or not adequate funding is available to meet even the needs of a
rationalized system.
Conclusion
In conclusion, while the alternatives aren't pleasant,
decisions need to be made. Roads and bridges cost money. The
question is, what level of service is the population of South
Dakota willing to support and sustain.
The state has the opportunity to design an integrated
transportation system to meet the needs of the 21st century. But
it will require some increase in the taxes, some abandonment of
roads and a lot of careful economic evaluation.
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The Future of the South Dakota Transportation System
by
James R. Myers, Director, Division of Railroads
What will the South Dakota transportation system look like in the future? I
think in some ways it may well be a reflection of the changes in transportation in
the United States at large and in some ways, I guess, as is usual for South Dakota,
lt*s going to be very unique.
I'm theoretically a railroad expert, so let's start with the railroads. In
our country today we have about 194,000 miles of first class railroads; almost
200,000 miles. One fifth or 40,000 miles of that trackage carries almost 70 percent
of the traffic. We're going to see some changes in this nation in our railroad in
dustry, but probably not the change you're expecting to hear me describe. The change
that we're going to see is that we are truly entering a new railroad era for this
country. But it's an era of the main line and it's an era that spells the end of
the branch line.
The problem is a simple one, we made a lot of decisions in the past that were
short-sighted. Since 1930, when our railroads were already in decline, we built 300.
billion dollars worth of "branch lines" in this country and we call them highways.
There was a time when our railroads were first built into this country when we
had a transportation system. The transportation system for grain was a very simple
one. The farmer put his grain in a wagon, he went eight, nine, maybe ten miles to
s rail terminal, the grain was transferred to the rail, and the farmer made it home
before dark. And then came the highway and the truck and we found that we could move
grain 20, 30, 40, 50 maybe 100 miles to a rail terminal and still make it home before
dark. But we didn't change, we didn't adapt. We told the railroads of this country
that "you are public necessities, you are public conveniences," and we developed
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regulations to keep them in business and keep them serving thousands upon thousands
of miles of areas that it was really no longer necessary for them to serve. We
literally forced them into competition with another transportation system.
The railroads responded by inventing a very useful tool. They called it
"deferred maintenance." And, in fact, many of the abandonments that we face in this
part of the country today are abandonments o'f 30 years ago. We just found out today
because the rail companies did in fact begin to abandon branch lines as much as 30,
AO and in some instances 50 years ago. And the realization is here. In 1976, our
Congress recognized the rail problems that are prevalent in the Midwest and after
coming up with a piece of leglislation that they called the Three R Act for the north
east corridor they went one better, I hope, and put together the railroad reform and
revitalization act or the Four R Act which was really directed at the Midwest. And
at the time that the Four R Act was implemented, we began to see some significant
changes: for one, it was made easier for railroads to abandon; and so, oftentimes when
we look and measure our rail system we measure in terms of 1976, not in 1925 when our
rail system peaked in South Dakota. But in 1925 we had A,425 miles of track in South
Dakota. In 1976, our later reference point, we had 3,340 miles. Today we have 2,758
miles, with much of that system, as much as two-thirds of it, threatened with possible
abandonment. But in 1976 when we had 3,340 miles I think there were some things you
should know about the character of that rail system.
It really fell into three categories: 30 percent of that rail system, the
bottom 30 percent, carried .7 of one percent of our rail traffic. The top 30 percent
carried 90 percent of our rail traffic. The 40 percent in the middle carried just
above 9 percent. In other words in 1976 we could have eliminated 30 percent of our
rail system and affected rail traffic by less than one percent. And I think that's
very significant. Why is it that we have to eliminate track at all? What's wrong
with the economics of railroading? What's happened to the railroads that literally
built this part of the country?
Times do change. Economic formulas change; we just talked about highways and
Clyde pointed out that in one year's time the inflationary increase in the cost of
building roads went up almost 22 percent. And, in fact, if you were to take a
fourth-quarter to fourth-quarter measurement in South Dakota for that same set
you'd find that the inflationary increase for that same set of years reaches 29
percent. We've had changes in railroads we well, and inflationary increases; and
we've come to a point in time where the average railroad in our country last year
attained about $140,000 of revenue per mile, and the average company made about
1,4 percent return on their investment.
If we were to take one of these companies and look at it in terms of South
Dakota's revenue, in South Dakota we have about $60 million (1978 dollars) of
revenue to offer this nation's railroads. If South Dakota was totally part of the
Burlington Northern system for example, a railroad with 25,000 miles and $2.5 billion
of revenue, at $100,000 a mile they would be willing to have 600 miles of South
Dakota in their system and at least they wouldn't improve their position nor would
their position deteriorate. Yet, in 1976 we had 3,340 miles, all of which we wanted
to keep.
If South Dakota was part of the Union Pacific, a railroad which operates 9,000
miles of track with revenues of about $2.9 billion or $323,000 in a mile, they d
be willing to operate all of 180 miles in South Dakota if they could have all of our
traffic.
Fortunately, our railroads are railroads like the Northwestern which has re
venues on the order of $74,000 per mile and if they had all of South Dakota s
traffic, maybe they'd be willing to operate 860 miles. But they'd like to be like
the Burlington Northern and have $100,000 per mile, and then the Burlington Northern
would like to be like the Union Pacific and have $332,000. The point is that in
terms of South Dakota commodities, however important transportation is to South
Dakota, we are not very important to transportation.
We talked a lot about using programs like the Iowa plan as a salvation for
South Dakota's railroads. The Iowa plan worked very well in Iowa, the program
where a user loans the railroad one-third of the cost of upgrading a particular
line. The state loans or grants the railroad another one-third of the cost; the
railroad provides the other one-third, providing that you're not dealing with a
bankrupt railroad. Together they set about and rehabilitate a section of track
and the users and the state are paid back on some per-car basis as this particu
lar line is used.
If we could take all of the potential rail shipping—not that which we could
lose to trucks—and put it all on hopper cars and ship it on one rail line, in an
Iowa-plan railroad we could upgrade about 225 miles of track in South Dakota. We
couldn't get across Iowa. So we have an economic problem with our rail system
that seems almost out of reach, yet we have to find a way to reach it and we've
got to find a way to keep a rail mode as part of our transportation system. And
the reason we have to, I think was made very clear in Clyde's presentation—the
cost, the size of our highway system; if we don't protect it with a rail system,
if we don't keep a substantial portion of our ton miles on the rails, we'll pay
^ the price of a railroad many times over, maybe four or five, but we'll pay it next
year, not this year.
If we look at shipping on our highways, our objective truly has to do what
we should have done in 1925, and that is build a transportation system. Every
highway priority in South Dakota must be, and I think will be, directed at support
of a strong core rail system, and the strong core rail system should have one over
riding purpose and that is to minimize the cost of our highway system. If we move
commodities by truck to the regional terminal and we move a million tons 10 miles,
we've moved 10 million ton miles. If we move that million tons all the way to
Minneapolis, we may have moved 300 million ton miles and the damage that we do
is 30 times greater. And what we're paying for in our highway system is the size
of loads. The damage goes up almost exponentially as the load increases, and the
number of miles that we move that load. You move it twice as far and you pay twice
as much. And we just can*t afford to make these moves on our highway system.
But in order to get these moves onto rail, we*re going to have to see some
significant changes, and I want to quote you some interesting statistics. Let's
presume that you want to ship a bushel of grain to the gulf of New Orleans from
Sioux Falls and you're a good-sized shipper.* Today if you ship by the Milwaukee
railroad it's going to cost you 78 cents a bushel. Of that, about 2 cents is going
to be the trucking costs to get it to the elevator, there's going to be another 12
cents that is the cost to the elevator, and the rest of it is the rail transportation
in a two-line haul. If you ship that same bushel of grain via the Milwaukee to a
barge at Dubuque, the elevator and the trucking costs will be nominally the same,
but your total costs will be 56 cents a bushel. If you are going to ship it to
Dubuque in a truck it costs you also 56 cents a bushel. In other words, it's just as
economical to ship your grain to a barge at Dubuque by truck as by rail until the day
comes when you've got to pay for the highway system. If you ship it by truck and a
barge at Sioux City you can do it for 41 cents, and that's the most economical way
that we have today, in terms of the cost from the producer's eye of making this move.
And yet if we were to move all of our commodities to Sioux City and onto a barge by
truck, we would destroy two things, our rail system and our highway system. The barge
system would prosper.
So we have to understand the weight of each decision we make in the near term
and what it does in the long term. Now we're going to see some changes. We're going
to see deregulation in this country like we have never thought of deregulation. Our
Congress has struck the word "subsidy" from their dictionary. And when the rail
system got so bad that the choice is subsidize or deregulate, the choice has been
made obvious. We're going to deregulate. We've already begun the deregulation process
in our airlines; we're going to see deregulation in trucking as well. Now deregulation
for me, I think, in the long-term is very good, because in the long-term we will al
locate the costs where they belong, and not in places where we don't see them until it's
too late.
The one fear that we all have to share at this point is how do you take one
of the most regulated industries in the country and deregulate it over night and
not cause a lot of anguish. And, develop a few victims in the process. But the
deregulation will come, and when it comes, the numbers that I've quoted you are
going to change. The trucking rates are going to be higher, conceivably, relative
to the rail, the barge companies will begin to pay for the use of the channels
presently maintained with taxpayers* money which we don't see on the present cost
of shipping, and this formula will change and we will react to the economics of
this change and those economics will be the things that mold a transportation
system for the future of South Dakota.
Now, briefly, what's it going to look like? You will have a minimum of rails,
probably the absolute minimum that can achieve some reasonable distribution of
rail service throughout our grain-gathering areas and throughout other areas of
needs such as mining areas and pulpwood lumber areas, and so on.
The highway system will be much the size it is now, but the priorities of the
highways will be substantially altered. The emphasis will be on highways to sup
port and provide access to the rail system. When you move by rail it's very un
likely that you'll be able to move any bulk commodity in less than a 25-car move.
The day of the single boxcar from an origin to a destination is gone. Unless
you're moving 25 hopper cars coupled together to the same destination your're not
going to make the move by rail. And yet the economics of making those moves will
cause us to develop terminals through which our elevators will access to rail lines.
A lot of other interesting things will happen. Some of them you won't see in
South Dakota, but we all remember the tank car. You don't see many of those in
South Dakota; they're coming, back a little bit. At this time railroad moves 100
tank cars at a time and they're all connected together with a big hose. You fill it
one place and you empty it one place. It's no longer economical to load an individual
tank car and empty an individual tank car.
Now, I'm not saying that big is better, but the 25-car move and the 100-car
move are the way of the future. And as I said earlier we are entering a new rail
road era. The railroads once again are going to be the backbone of transportation
in this nation, but that backbone is going to be 50,000 miles of main line, and
not 200,000 miles of main line and branch lines. It's going to happen for a couple
of simple reasons, not only the highway maintenance that we've talked about, but also
because of rising energy costs. Trucks are significantly more efficient than rail
in the short haul, but rails beat trucks anywhere from four to seven times in the
long haul. And that is another reason that we will work together to develop the
transportation system that we forgot to in 1925.
